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• Storage operational value very small at modest penetrations
• Storage reduces generator starts, but arbitrage value is small
• Increasing quantities of energy storage increases carbon emissions
• Carbon emissions increase most in a low gas price / high renewables scenario
Abstract
The central question we seek to address in this paper is: How rapidly do the operating
cost benefits of grid-scale energy storage decline as installed storage capacity increases?
We use a 240-bus model based on the US Western Interconnection, first optimally locating
storage in the network and then dispatching it in a unit commitment model with DC load
flow. The model uses storage to provide frequency regulation, load following, and arbitrage
for each hour of a study year, and we investigate a range of scenarios for fuel price and
renewables penetration. We find that value from long-term energy shifting is negligible at all
penetrations we investigate, but also that displacing fossil-fueled generators from providing
reserves is initially very valuable. However, in most scenarios the value is negligible beyond
10 GWh of storage, or the equivalent of roughly 6 minutes of average demand in the system.
Above penetrations of 4-8 GWh, storage operating cost benefits are less than estimated
capacity values for storage. We also show that storage has the potential to increase overall
carbon emissions in the electricity sector, even when it is not providing significant amounts
of arbitrage and is preferentially providing regulation and load following services.
Keywords: Energy storage, Ancillary services, Unit commitment
1. Introduction
Energy storage is an important part of a variety of proposed scenarios for future grid
evolution (Williams et al., 2012; Nelson et al., 2012; Piwko et al., 2010; Corbus et al., 2009;
Krajacˇic´ et al., 2011; Jacobson and Delucchi, 2011). Depending on the type of storage
technology, energy storage has the potential to reduce peak loads, decrease the need for
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conventional ancillary services, postpone infrastructure investment, provide ramp support
for renewables, and increase system reliability (Electric Power Research Institute, 2010; Eyer
and Corey, 2010). At present, energy storage resources are limited, coming primarily from
hydropower (Loose, 2011). In the near term, the buildout of newer technologies – including
compressed air energy storage (CAES), sodium sulfur batteries, fly wheels, and lithium ion
batteries – will depend on the potential for storage to provide value to the current electricity
system.
The most obvious use for storage devices is energy arbitrage, where storage devices
are charged when prices (or system loads in regions without a real time energy price) are
low, and then discharged when prices (or system loads) are high. Several papers have
investigated the potential for energy storage to provide arbitrage services in various systems,
e.g. (Lueken and Apt, 2014; Hittinger and Azevedo, 2015; Bradbury et al., 2014). However
as the total capacity of storage on the system grows, or if the average spread of energy prices
decreases with the addition of high-penetration renewables, the arbitrage value of storage
could decline (Harris et al., 2012; Sioshansi et al., 2009; Hildmann et al., 2011). Some recent
work suggests that revenue from arbitrage does not grow for storage capacities in excess of
5 hours (Bradbury et al., 2014).
As an alternative, several papers investigate the potential for storage to provide reserves.
Drury et al. (2011) find that providing reserves in addition to arbitrage services can net an
additional $13-51/kW-yr in revenues for storage devices. Harris et al. (2012) studied the
impact of a range of storage technologies in a unit commitment model that included reserve
constraints, and although they did not directly report on the value of providing reserves at
different penetration levels, they did find that the operating benefits of storage technologies
other than CAES do not justify their economic costs. Walawalkar et al. (2007) and Sioshansi
and Denholm (2010) also demonstrate that there are benefits to providing reserves services
using storage devices. Additionally, Byrne and Silva-Monroy (2012) show that regulation is
the more valuable service to provide over arbitrage. In combination with Bradbury et. al.’s
exploration of the relationship between revenue from arbitrage and duration, these results
strongly suggest that optimizing storage device deployment for reserves over arbitrage will
maximally add value.
Denholm and Sioshansi (2009) also raise the possibility that there is value to colocating
storage with intermittent renewables, but while they demonstrate the value for individual
producers by increasing the proportion of their power they are able to sell over a constrained
network, they also indicate that the overall system benefits of storage are maximized when
storage is operating according to system-wide price signals, rather than according to an
individual generator’s needs. Nevertheless, the location of storage is still important in a
congested network, as the congestion relief provided by storage can allow power to flow from
remote locations to demand centers.
However, these papers shed little light on how these relationships will evolve as we install
increasing quantities of storage on the grid. Services valuable at low penetrations of storage
are likely to be less valuable on the margin at higher penetrations. This paper builds on
these earlier investigations by examining how rapidly the operating cost benefits – including
reserve provision and arbitrage – of grid-scale energy storage decline as the quantity installed
increases. To answer this question we simulate storage operation over a year at different
levels of renewable generation, fuel prices and quantities of storage added. We use a model
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that iteratively adds storage capacity to a 240-bus model, choosing buses that maximize
locational value. The model then uses the added resources to provide frequency regulation,
load following, and arbitrage for each hour of the year. The choice of which services to
provide is determined endogenously, based on the most valuable actions and the current
operating constraints of the system. The model is based on a previously published model
of the US Western Interconnection (WECC) (Price and Goodin, 2011), however our central
objective is to make broad conclusions about how storage value depends on a variety of
factors, rather than to precisely capture the specific value of storage in the WECC context.
As with earlier studies that include reserves, we find that storage value does not come
from multi-hour energy shifting, but instead from displacing fossil-fueled generators from
providing reserves; as such systems with higher requirements for regulation and load following
provide more opportunity for storage value. However we find that the operating cost benefits
due to storage decline very quickly with increasing penetrations: In most scenarios the
value is negligible beyond 10 GWh of storage, or the equivalent of roughly 6 minutes of
average demand in the system. We also find that, above penetrations of 4-8 GWh, storage
operating cost benefits are less than hypothetical capacity values for storage – this suggests
that capacity value will dominate investment decisions above those penetrations. In the long
run, if penetrations of wind and solar grow even further and power system fuel mixes evolve
to accommodate those changes, energy storage could play a more important role in diurnal
(or longer) energy shifting, as in Mileva (2014). However our results suggest that in the
short run energy storage has relatively little value at the transmission level.
While operating cost benefits are small, we do show that storage has the potential to
increase overall carbon emissions in the electricity sector, even when it is not providing
significant amounts of arbitrage and is preferentially providing regulation and load following
services. These carbon increases continue beyond the point where storage provides significant
operating cost benefits, meaning that even if the primary economic driver for building storage
is capacity value, its day-to-day operations could be detrimental to system-wide carbon
emissions. The carbon emissions increase is greatest in a high renewables / low gas price
scenario, which is consistent with the most likely future conditions in light of energy futures
prices and renewables capacity expansion rates.
2. Methods
2.1. Model and Solution Method
The model used for this analysis is an hourly unit commitment model of the Western In-
terconnection (also referred to as the Western Electricity Coordinating Council, or WECC).
The model is formulated as a mixed-integer linear program that minimizes system operat-
ing costs subject to constraints on generator operation, storage device operation, DC power
flow, and reserve requirements, which include both a short-duration regulation service, and a
longer-duration load-following service. It is solved using a branch-and-cut algorithm that is
implemented using the CPLEX 12.5 C++ library. Values and data sources for any constants
in the following section are described in more detail in Section 2.2.
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2.1.1. Objective Function
The objective function minimizes total system operating costs over the set G of generators
on the system and the set of time periods modeled, T , as follows:
min
∑
g∈G
∑
t∈T
Γgqgt + SUgsgt, (1)
where qgt is a decision variable denoting the level of output for generator g in time period
t and sgt is a decision variable denoting whether or not generator g started up in hour t.
Both Γg, the marginal cost for running generator g, and SUg, the startup cost for generator
g, depend on the fuel price Fg for generator g. Explicitly, Γg = Fg ∗ HRg + Og, where
HRg and Og are respectively the heat rate for generator g and the variable operations and
maintenance cost for generator g.1 We define startup cost as SUg = SEg ∗ Fg + SAg, where
SEg is the energy required to start generator g, and SAg is the fixed cost component of
starting generator g.
2.1.2. Generator Constraints
In each time period, each generator g in the model can supply regulation up, rugt and
regulation down, rdgt as well as load following up, lf
u
gt and load following down, lf
d
gt, in
addition to the energy supplied, qgt. These terms are related by the following two constraints:
qgt + r
u
gt + lf
u
gt ≤ Qgugt ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T , (2)
qgt − rdgt − lfdgt ≥ Qgugt ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T , (3)
where ugt is a binary decision variable denoting whether or not generator g is operating in
time period t, and Qg and Qg are the maximum and minimum generation limits, respectively,
for generator g. Each of the ancillary service variables must also be less than their respective
limits for each generator:
0 ≤ rugt ≤ RUgugt ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T (4)
0 ≤ rdgt ≤ RDgugt ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T (5)
0 ≤ lfugt ≤ LFUgugt ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T (6)
0 ≤ lfdgt ≤ LFDgugt ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T (7)
Between hours, generators are subject to ramp rate constraints:
R−g ≤ qgt − qg,t−1 − rdgt − lfdgt ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T (8)
R+g ≥ qgt − qg,t−1 + rugt + lfugt ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T (9)
1For simplicity we assume heat rate is constant across each generator’s output range
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Continuous startup variables for generators are used with binary operating variables and
minimum up and down times in the manner described by Papavasiliou (2011):
t∑
k=t−UTg+1
sgk ≤ ugt ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T (10)
t+DTg∑
k=t+1
sgk ≤ 1− ugt g ∈ G, t ∈ T (11)
sgt ≥ ugt − ug,t−1 ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T (12)
0 ≤ sgt ≤ 1 ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T (13)
ugt ∈ {0, 1} ∀g ∈ G, t ∈ T . (14)
2.1.3. Storage Constraints
We model energy arbitrage in each storage device as scheduled consumption or supply
of energy in hourly blocks. We also model the commitment of storage capacity to provide
regulation and load following reserves and enforce constraints on reserves that avoid “double
counting” capacity, i.e. if capacity is committed to providing reserves it cannot also be used
for arbitrage.
Energy in storage device m at time t, emt must be less than the capacity Em of the
storage device, where M is the set of all storage devices on the system:
0 ≤ emt ≤ Em ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T (15)
The charge and discharge rates for the storage device are also constrained by the power
limits (P charge, P discharge) of the storage device:
0 ≤ cmt ≤ P chargem ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T (16)
0 ≤ dmt ≤ P dischargem ∀m ∈M, t ∈ T (17)
(18)
All storage devices must also satisfy energy balance for scheduled arbitrage in all hours, such
that
emt = em,t−1 + τβmcmt − τ
δm
dmt, (19)
where cmt and dmt are scheduled hourly charge and discharge rates, respectively, between
hour t − 1 and hour t, τ is the time period length in hours, and β and δ are the charging
efficiency and discharging efficiency, respectively, of storage device m.
We enforce constraints to ensure that each battery is capable of serving the worst case
reserve action in addition to delivering or consuming energy according to the arbitrage
schedule. Discharging, regulation up, and load following up all require energy to leave the
storage device, so the sum of the energy needed to provide each of those services (in the
worst case where reserves are provided at the full contracted power for the total contracted
duration) in hour t must be greater than the amount available at the beginning of the
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hour. Similarly, charging, regulation down, and load following down rely on headroom in
the storage device, so their sum must be less than the head room available at the beginning
of the hour. These constraints are represented as follows:
em,t−1 ≥ 1
δm
(
τdmt + τ
rrusmt + τ
lf lfusmt
)
, (20)
Em − em,t−1 ≥ βm
(
τcmt + τ
rrdsmt + τ
lf lfdsmt
)
, (21)
where τ r is the length of time for which regulation must be provided in hours, τ lf is the
length of time for which load following must be provided in hours, and rusmt, r
ds
mt, lf
us
mt, and
lfdsmt represent the power contributions of the storage device at node n to regulation up,
regulation down, load following up, and load following down, respectively, in time period t
(we will define these parameters in Section 2.2).
2.1.4. Network Constraints
We enforce nodal power balance constraints for hourly schedules with a linear DC load
flow model: ∑
g∈Gn
(qgt) +
∑
m∈Mn
(cmt − dmt) +
∑
i∈N
Bni(θnt − θit) = Lnt, (22)
where Gn is the subset of generators located at node n, Mn is the subset of generators located
at node n, Bni is the susceptance between node n and node i, θnt is the voltage angle at
node n at time t, and Lnt is the load at node n at time t.
Also, the total load flow on line ij must be less than or equal to the maximum load flow
allowed, Dij:
Bij(θit − θjt) ≤ Dij (23)
Note that we do not model power flow associated with reserve actions; we assume that
any line capacity violations that result from reserve actions are sufficiently small or short
in duration that they can be tolerated by the system operator or, in the case of larger
disturbances, that the system can be redispatched to resolve constraints. We assume these
events are sufficiently rare that they can be neglected for our objective of quantifying the
annual cost benefits of storage at the scale of the model.
2.1.5. Reserve Requirements
In each hour, minimum reserves of each type (regulation in up and down directions, load
following in up and down directions) must be procured, corresponding to system needs. We
model daily regulation up and down requirements as a proportion, ρ, of the peak load for the
day added to a proportion, σ, of the total installed wind and solar capacity. We model load
following up for each hour as a proportion, η, of the forecasted load plus a proportion, ν, of
the forecasted wind and solar for the hour. We model the load following down requirement
as a constant proportion of the renewables forecast. The following equations define these
constraints explicitly, with Sn and W n being the solar and wind capacities installed at node
n, respectively, and Snt and Wnt being the solar and wind forecasts at node n during time
6
period t. To reduce complexity, we model total reserves constraints globally.
∑
g∈G
(rugt) +
∑
m∈M
(rusmt) ≥ ρ
(
max
a∈T :tmax−a≥t
Lna
)
+ σ
(∑
n∈N
(Sn +W n)
)
∀t ∈ T (24)
∑
g∈G
(rdgt) +
∑
m∈M
(rdsmt) ≥ ρ
(
max
a∈T :tmax−a≥t
Lna
)
+ σ
(∑
n∈N
(Sn +W n)
)
∀t ∈ T (25)∑
g∈G
(lfugt) +
∑
m∈M
(lfusmt) ≥ η
∑
n inN
Lnt + ν
∑
n∈N
(Snt +Wnt) ∀t ∈ T (26)∑
g∈G
(lfdgt) +
∑
m∈M
(lfdsmt) ≥ ν
∑
n∈N
(Snt +Wnt) ∀t ∈ T (27)
2.1.6. Solution Method
We run the model iteratively for each of the days in a given year, passing the final storage
levels, generator output levels for ramping, and generator operating and starting levels as
constants denoting the starting levels for the next day. This corresponds to the following
constraints, where the prev superscript denotes variables from the previous day’s solve:
en0 = e
prev
n24 ∀g ∈ G (28)
ugb = u
prev
g,24+b ∀g ∈ G, b ∈ (−DTg + 1, ..., 0) (29)
sgb = s
prev
g,24+b ∀g ∈ G, b ∈ (min(−UTg + 1,−DTg + 1), ..., 0) (30)
Additionally, because it would otherwise be optimal to fully discharge storage devices at
the end of each unit commitment modeling period, we also constrain the final storage levels
and generator operating levels. To do this, we run a preliminary two-day unit commitment
model with a four hour time step for the generator unit commitment variables, and save
the generator and storage states at the end of the first day for use as constraints in a
second run. In the second (final) run, we use single-day unit commitment in one hour
increments with final storage charge levels and final generator operating states constrained
to be equal to those saved from the first run (as in (Sioshansi and Denholm, 2010)). This
corresponds to the following additional constraints for the first two-day unit commitment,
where T = {t ∈ Z : 1 ≤ t ≤ 48}
ugt = ug,t−1 = ug,t−2 = ug,t−3 ∀g ∈ G, {t ∈ T : t mod 4 = 0} (31)
We implement the model in C++ and solve it with CPLEX 12.5. We solve the first
two-day unit commitment problem with a mip gap of 0.5%, and the second problem with a
mip gap of 0.05%. The average time taken to solve these two problems and obtain results
for an individual day was 72.4 seconds.
2.2. Data Inputs
The layout of the system network for the model is based on data for the 240-bus model
created and published in association with a model developed at CAISO (Price and Goodin,
2011), hereafter the Price model. From this resource, we obtain susceptances Bij and line
limits Dij for the network. The hourly load at each node, Lnt, also comes from the Price
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Figure 1: The load duration curve for the year of data modeled.
model, and is based on 2004 data. Though WECC infrastructure has evolved since that
time2, our objective in using the Price model is to capture the effect of storage operating
over large scales, but not to precisely model the effect of storage on current infrastructure.
However as we will discuss, we will investigate how storage additions impact system opera-
tions in different renewables penetration scenarios. Figure 1 shows the yearly load duration
curve.
In total, the model commits and dispatches 185 generators, of which 38 are coal-fired, 135
are gas-fired, 4 are nuclear, and 8 are run on fuel oil. The model does not dispatch hydro,
biomass, wind, solar, and geothermal plants; instead the production profiles and capacities
for those generators originate in the Price model. The set of dispatched generators used is
based on disaggregated generator data from the Price model, which are then modified such
that generators with similar heat rates are aggregated together, and each node in the network
has only one generator with each heat rate, which reduces symmetry in the subsequent
formulation. From the Price data we obtain heat rates and maximum operating capacities
for each generator (HRg, Qg). We obtain fuel prices Fg from EIA data corresponding to
2007 and 2013 (US Energy Information Administration, 2013). Figure 2 shows how the heat
rate curves for all generators with non-zero marginal cost on the system change with fuel
prices.
We match the prime mover for a generator in the Price data, when available, to TEPPC
2In the time since the model was built, total demand has remained relatively flat (WECC, 2013) and
generation capacity for all fuels but wind, solar and natural gas were virtually unchanged (EIA, 2015).
Gas capacity has grown significantly since 2004, however because total and peak demand remained flat this
capacity has had relatively little impact on operations. We will discuss wind and solar additions later in the
paper.
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Figure 2: The supply curves for the set of generators modeled, in the low and high gas price scenarios. The
supply curves in this graph are created for the low renewables scenarios; the high renewables scenarios have
a larger region where the marginal cost is zero.
generator category data from the 2009 TEPPC Study Program Results to obtain ramp
limits (R+g , R
−
g ), minimum up- and down-times (UTg, DTg), minimum operating capacities
(Q
g
), start-up costs and startup energy required (SAg, SEg), and variable operations and
maintenance costs (Og). When only a fuel type, rather than a prime mover is available
from the Price data, we chose the generator type from the TEPPC data with the heat rate
that is the closest to the heat rate reported from the data in the Price model and use the
corresponding figures.
In each hour, we enforce ancillary service constraints for regulation and load following.
We model these on the requirements used in Piwko et al. (2010). Total regulation in both
directions must be greater than 1% of peak load (ρ = 0.01) in both directions. The Western
Wind Integration Study indicates that 1% of peak is acceptable for regulation with respect
to wind capacity, but does not investigate whether this also applies for additions of solar. To
ensure that regulation needs are satisfied with the addition of both resources, we also add
1% of the installed wind and solar capacities to the regulation requirement in both directions
(σ = 0.01). Total load following in the up direction must be greater than the sum of 3%
of forecasted load and 5% of forecasted wind and solar (η = 0.03, ν = 0.05), in accordance
with the ”3+5” rule. In accordance with the need for load following in the down direction as
specified in Makarov et al. (2009), we also require an amount of reserve in the down direction
equal to 5% of forecasted wind and solar.
The maximum regulation (RUg, RDg) and load following capabilities (LFUg, LFDg) of
each generator are calculated based on the maximum generator movement in 10 minutes,
using the one-minute ramp rate for the generator’s prime mover (WECC, 2010). Generator
limits on ramps between hours were calculated based on maximum generator movement in
9
60 mins. (Papavasiliou, 2011)
In addition to the generators, the model also dispatches 4 pumped-hydro plants in all
scenarios. The efficiencies and capabilities for the pumped hydro plants are taken from the
Price model, and comprise 3.0 GW of power, with 201 GWh of total energy capacity.
We assume that storage efficiency is 90% on both charge (βn) and discharge (δn) and
a power:energy ratio of 4, such that P dischargen /En = 4. By choosing this ratio, we ensure
that power constraints will bind for regulation, and energy constraints will bind for load
following and arbitrage. Both pumped hydro and added storage can provide regulation and
load-following, subject to constraints that require enough energy to be present in the battery
(or energy capacity for charging in the case of down reserves) for provision of 15 minutes of
regulation and 2 hours of load following (Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) with τ r = 0.25 hrs and τ l =
2 hrs) (Sioshansi and Denholm, 2010).
2.3. Placing Storage in the Model
We determined the locations for storage devices prior to running the unit-commitment
model by slightly modifying the model. Specifically, we include decision variables denoting
the total amount of energy storage capacity to be added at each node and, for each total
storage quantity Etot we investigate, we constrain the sum of storage capacity across all
nodes such that
∑
∀nEn ≤ Etot. Because these added decision variables significantly increase
the complexity of the model we made several modifications to limit computing time in the
placement phase. First, we only run the model on the peak demand day. Second, because
reserves are not a location-specific quantity in the model, we dropped reserve requirements
from the objective function. Finally, we identified storage locations iteratively, i.e. after
locating the smallest quantity of storage, we fix its location and identify the location of
the next increment of storage, and so on. Because of these modifications to the model,
added increments of storage are only optimal for energy arbitrage on the peak demand day.
However, because the peak demand day is the most severely constrained and energy is the
only quantity subject to nodal balance constraints, we assume that the identified locations
are a decent proxy for the true optimal locations. In all scenarios, storage is preferentially
located in San Diego before any other locations.
2.4. Scenarios
We explored four different scenarios that allowed us to explore the effects on the value of
storage of high vs. low natural gas prices and high vs. low penetrations of renewables. First,
we explored low and high natural gas prices. We used average fuel prices from recent years in
which gas prices were relatively high (2007; the “high gas price” scenario, $7.12/MMBtu for
gas and $1.77/MMBtu for coal, 2007 $ (US Energy Information Administration, 2008)) and
relatively low (2012; the “low gas price” scenario, $3.17/MMBtu for gas and $2.22/MMBtu
for coal (US Energy Information Administration, 2013)). Figure 2 shows a supply curve
for the generators and prices modeled. For each natural gas price, we also looked at a
low-penetration renewables scenario and a high-penetration renewables scenario that meets
California’s RPS goals (Price and Goodin, 2011). The low penetration scenario has 6.5 GW
of wind and 0.5 GW of solar, whereas the high-penetration scenario has 24 GW of wind, and
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7 GW of solar.3 We also perform a low wind, high solar scenario high-penetration scenario
where we scale solar profiles and wind profiles such that their respective installed capacities
are reversed.
3. Results
3.1. Total Social Benefit from Storage
Figure 3 shows the total system cost savings for each of the four major scenarios as a
function of storage energy added to the system. The range of benefits across scenarios is very
large, and both renewables penetration levels and fuel prices have significant impact on the
outcome, though for the scenarios we investigate fuel prices appear to matter more. Note
that, because some capacity is allocated to regulation (requiring a 4C battery) and some to
spinning reserve (requiring a 1/4C battery), we report results only in units of energy storage
(GWh) on the x-axis, rather than units of power capacity. We also find that, for a given
penetration of renewables, the specific mix of solar and wind has little impact (less than 4%)
on savings attributable to storage (Figure 4). This is in contrast to other recent results that
suggest storage is more important in systems with high solar versus high wind penetration
(e.g. (Mileva, 2014)). We attribute this difference to several observations: (1) our model
optimizes only the operation of the system but not the mix of generation infrastructure as
in (Mileva, 2014) and (2) storage does relatively little net load shifting in our model and
instead is allocated to the higher value ancillary services; we will discuss this more when we
describe Fig. 9 below. Finally, we note that storage will be more important for load shifting
at higher solar penetrations.
Figure 5 shows the marginal benefit for storage for a 20-year time horizon with a 7%
discount rate, assuming identical cost savings each year (left vertical axis), and also for a
single year (right vertical axis). The marginal benefit is computed as the ratio of the change
in operating cost resulting from each incremental addition of storage to the size of the storage
increment. We see that the diversity in value of a small addition of storage capacity across
scenarios is large, with the 20-year benefit ranging from $1800/kWh in the high gas price
/ high renewables scenario to about $200/kWh in both low gas price scenarios. Still, with
small amounts of storage on the system, the marginal benefit of additional storage in every
scenario is greater than the ARPA-E GRIDS target of $100/kWh (ARPA-E, 2010) (depicted
as a dashed line in Figure 5), suggesting that discounted system benefits would be greater
than storage capital costs for storage technologies that meet this target.4 The marginal
benefit then drops off sharply, such that by the time 10 GWh of storage capacity have been
added to the system,5 the marginal benefit in all scenarios falls below $100/kWh. By the
3These scenarios are taken directly from the Price model; wind and solar capacity in WECC in the most
recent available year (2013) were approximately 18 and 5 GW, respectively (EIA, 2015)
4ARPA-E’s target is for systems 1C systems, i.e. batteries that discharge their rated energy in 1 hour.
Frequency regulation requires higher power rating (we assume 4C, or systems that discharge their rated
energy in 1/4 hour), which would add to the cost of the technology, possibly significantly more. Therefore
$100/kWh in our context should be taken as an especially low and aggressive target.
5For context, at an average demand of 97.1 GW (the average for the dataset used here), 10 GWh of
storage capacity could supply average demand in the model for 6 minutes and 11 seconds.
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Figure 3: System cost savings as storage penetration is increased. System cost savings level out in each
scenario, and by the time 20 GWh of additional storage are added, increasing the amount of storage on the
system no longer produces significant savings.
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been reallocated, such that about 66% of the total renewable energy comes from solar (the low wind / high
solar scenario). The default case has been provided as the high wind / low solar scenario. The distribution
of energy between wind and solar does not significantly affect the value provided by storage.
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Figure 5: Marginal benefit of additional storage. In all scenarios, the benefit of adding an additional unit of
storage decreases as the total amount of storage capacity on the system is increased.
time 20 GWh of additional storage are added, increasing the amount of storage on the system
no longer produces significant operating cost savings. We note that current battery costs are
significantly higher than the ARPA-E target, however we do not consider those costs here
because the industry is in a phase of rapid cost reduction and policies to support energy
storage are likely to be based on the potential for cost:benefit ratios to be attractive in the
future rather than today.
The most likely scenario for the future is one in which gas prices are low, and in these
scenarios the $100/kWh break-even point allows no more than 4 GWh of energy storage
capacity on the system before capital costs (at the $100/kWh target) are no longer recovered
through system benefits. Capital costs depend strongly on technology type and power to
energy ratio, and battery-only cost estimates (i.e. not including balance of system costs)
currently span a very broad range (Nykvist and Nilsson, 2015), although many are working
to develop storage devices that will meet the ARPA-E GRIDS target at scale (Zhang et al.,
2012; Narayanan et al., 2012).
We can also compare these marginal benefits to the capacity value6 that storage might
provide. To do this, we divide the lowest cost of conventional generation capacity (we
used the overnight cost for a combustion turbine, taken from (Black and Veatch, 2012) as
$650/kW) by the number of hours storage would need to operate to be qualified as providing
capacity value to the system (we assume 4 hours, based on recent requests for offers in
California (San Diego Gas and Electric, 2014)). These parameters give an approximate
storage capacity value of $160/kWh. In the low gas price scenarios, the marginal value
of storage for providing arbitrage and ancillary services quickly falls below this number,
6By capacity value we mean the amount of power a device can make available during peak load conditions.
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suggesting that capacity payments will be an important factor for storage investment in
these conditions. On the other hand, for the high gas price / high renewables scenario,
capacity payments may not drive investment in storage until higher penetrations (8-10 GWh
across the system). Note that capacity value will be higher in “load pockets” with strong
constraints on citing conventional generators (e.g. the Los Angeles basin); analysis of these
conditions is outside the scope of this paper.
Figure 6 shows the proportions of various ancillary services requirements that are satisfied
by storage. Because storage satisfies regulation up requirements first, these results indicate
that regulation up is the most valuable service for storage to satisfy. The next most valuable
services are load following up and regulation down, and finally load following down. With a
higher gas price, more of the load following up requirement is satisfied by storage. While it
might otherwise make sense to satisfy both load following up and regulation down services
with the same storage device, in practice this will be undesirable, as regulation requires
higher power capacity than load following, and a single storage device will likely be better
suited for one or the other service. For investment purposes, it may be reasonable to invest
first in high power, lower energy capacity storage devices that will supply regulation up and
down, and then later install more moderate power devices with higher energy capacities that
can satisfy load following requirements in both directions.
Figures 7 and 8 indicate that the number of generator starts and the cost due to gen-
erator starts both decrease in all scenarios as the amount of storage present in the system
is increased. The savings due to reductions in generator starts is roughly 10 percent in the
most impactful scenario (high renewables penetrations and high gas prices). With lower gas
prices, the reduction in generator starts due to storage devices is much less dramatic than
in the scenarios with higher gas prices. This is likely due to the fact that, in lower gas price
scenarios, generators need to be turned off for a longer length of time to make incurring their
startup costs economical.
3.2. Private and Market Benefits from Storage
In this section we investigate storage device profits and whether the system benefit from
storage can be captured by independent storage operators. For energy market revenue, we
assume each generator or storage device is paid the locational marginal price (LMP) for the
node at which it is located. We obtain this price from the dual of the node balance constraint
Eq. (22), which we will call λnt, where n ∈ N and t ∈ T . Assuming a competitive market,
we compute the market clearing price for each reserve market in each hour as the maximum
opportunity cost ($/MW) faced by a generator that is providing the corresponding resource
in that hour. We will refer to these hourly prices as λrut , λ
rd
t , λ
lfu
t , and λ
lfd
t for regulation up,
regulation down, load following up, and load following down, respectively. Only generators
constrained by their maximum capacities (for generators providing up reserves) or minimum
capacities (for generators providing down reserves) experience opportunity costs. Generators
that have not committed their full, currently available capacities are indifferent to committing
their capacities to one market versus another; they have available capacity to do both (Wu
et al., 2004).
The gross profit, zi, for a given storage device i over the entire year, then, is calculated
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Figure 6: Proportions of ancillary services served by storage devices in various scenarios. In all scenarios,
storage quickly moves to provide all required regulation up. Subsequently, storage emphasizes the provision
of regulation down and load following up, and then finally begins to increase the proportion of load following
down provided.
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Figure 7: Number of generator starts per year. As the total amount of additional storage capacity on the
system increases, the total number of generator starts decreases. The resulting reduction in startup costs
paid contributes to the corresponding decreases in total system operating costs, as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 8: Cost of generator starts. As the total amount of additional storage capacity on the system increases,
the total cost of generator starts decreases. The resulting reduction in startup costs paid contributes to the
corresponding decreases in total system operating costs, as shown in Figure 3.
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as follows:
zi =
∑
t∈T
(
λitdit − λitcit + λrut rusit + λrdt rdsit + λlfut lfusit + λlfdt lfdsit
)
(32)
The total gross profit in the system, Z, is the sum of the zi’s over all storage devices in the
system (i ∈ S). Gross profit is calculated as the revenue received in the energy, regulation,
and load following markets, less the cost to charge storage with energy purchased in the
market. We do not include other costs or revenues in this metric (for example storage
capital costs, taxes and depreciation, or tax incentives).
Figure 9 shows the changes in the value of the contribution to Z of reserves, load following,
and energy arbitrage as additional storage devices are added to the system. The total revenue
available is largest in the high renewables / high gas price case, when the reserve requirements
are the largest due to the renewables, and the market clearing prices are set by generators
with higher marginal fuel costs. The value to storage operators is coming from reserves
more than arbitrage; in fact, as the total amount of storage on the system increases, storage
operators lose money in the energy markets in favor of making capacity available for the
more lucrative regulation and load following markets. Notably, while the regulation markets
are the most lucrative initially, the revenue in these markets drops off quickly, and load
following is the service that provides the most revenue over the largest range of installed
storage capacities.
Figure 10 shows the marginal changes in Z as the total amount of storage in the system
is increased. The total market revenue is largest in the high renewables / high gas price
case, when the reserve requirements are the largest due to the renewables, and the market
clearing prices are set by generators with higher marginal fuel costs due to the higher gas
prices. Similar to the operating cost benefits, this metric also declines rapidly, and once
the system has at least 10 GWh of capacity installed, the market revenue for energy and
ancillary services available to storage operators becomes small and unlikely to cover storage
capital costs on their own.
Figure 11 shows the ratio of the estimated market revenue (Z) for storage to its corre-
sponding operating cost savings. In the figure, the ratio dips below one between 4 GWh and
6 GWh of storage capacity. This indicates that at this point, the system benefits from the
presence of storage are no longer captured by storage operators through the markets modeled
here. Primarily, these unaccounted for system benefits are realized as avoided starts when
minimum up/down time constraints or ramp constraints would otherwise bind. Because
storage operators are reliant on prices that are set by marginal costs of generators, storage
operators are not able to realize the full value of their services, as the value of avoided starts
is not reflected in the market clearing price for generation.
3.3. Carbon Emissions Due to Storage
As storage is added to the system, the carbon emissions associated with operating the
system increase for most scenarios. Figure 12 shows that carbon dioxide emissions strictly
increase in most scenarios as storage penetration increases. In the high henewables, high
gas price scenario carbon dioxide emissions experience a slight decrease until 1 GWh of
storage capacity is present, and then emissions begin to increase. This effect is driven by
fuel switching (from gas to coal), as shown in Figure 13. When gas prices are low, there is
17
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Figure 9: Revenue obtained by storage due to each service provided. Revenue is calculated by paying the
storage devices the market clearing price for each service provided. In general, as storage is added to the
system, the total revenue achieved by storage decreases. At very high penetrations, storage devices lose
money in energy markets so that they may participate in the ancillary services markets.
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Figure 10: Gross profit, calculated as revenues less costs to charge, per kWh installed. As storage is added
to the system, the gross profit seen by all storage operators decreases.
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Figure 11: Ratio of net revenue obtained by storage to system benefit provided by storage, relative to the
base case with no storage. Between 4 and 6 GWh of storage the ratio dips below 1, which indicates that the
system benefits provided by storage operationally are no longer able to be captured by storage operators via
modeled markets.
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Figure 12: As storage is added to the system, the carbon dioxide released due to system operations increases.
In 2005, WECC emissions were between 370 and 385 MMT Carr (2008).
less incentive to turn off gas plants to save money, since the savings from plant cycling is
not enough to overcome large startup costs. This causes there to be more resources available
on the system that can act as base load. The gas plants that are held on at their minimum
capacities to avoid future startup costs are still more expensive to use on the margin than
coal plants during operation, so coal plants are more frequently used at higher capacities.
It is particularly notable that the most significant emissions increases happen in the
high renewables / low gas price scenario, which may well be the most likely in light of
energy futures prices and renewables capacity growth rates. We will revisit this issue in the
conclusions.
4. Discussion
We find that both fuel prices and renewables penetrations have a strong impact on the
operational savings (see Figure 3), with fuel prices having a larger influence across the
scenarios we investigated. This is driven in large part by the substantial difference in fuel
prices in the 2007-2012 range we considered and particularly the large difference between
the price of gas-fired peaker pants and coal-fired baseload plants (see the step change in
marginal costs at 130 GW in the supply curve in Figure 2).
Having high concentrations of renewables also corresponds to important operating cost
benefits for storage — savings from storage in high renewables situations is roughly double
what it is in the low penetration scenarios we investigated. This is due to the increased
reserve requirements. As we showed in Figure 9, in all scenarios the most valuable functions
for storage to take over are reserve functions. We also note that operating cost benefits will
further increase if one considers renewables penetrations beyond those we investigated; these
benefits may eventually be comparable to the potential benefits at high gas prices. However
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Figure 13: This figure shows the emissions sources broken out by scenario. From Figure 12, the largest
increase in CO2 emissions comes from a high renewables penetration and a low gas price. In all scenarios,
as the amount of storage added is increased, emissions from coal plants rise. In cases with a high gas price,
emissions from combined cycle plants also rise, but with a low gas price they fall. In all scenarios, emissions
from combustion turbines fall as the penetration of storage devices increases.
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we do not observe large differences in the benefits from storage when the renewables mix
is mostly solar rather than mostly wind, because it is optimal to use storage primarily for
reserves, rather than arbitrage services. This means that the timing of the resource is less
important than its relative contribution to reserves requirements at the penetrations we
investigated.
The observation that it is more valuable for storage devices to provide reserves than arbi-
trage services is true from the perspectives of both storage operators and system operators.
In all scenarios, regulation up is the most valuable service for storage to provide, followed
by regulation down and load following up, and finally load following down. In general, load
following provides the most revenue to storage operators, primarily because the market for
load following is larger than the market for regulation. We also observe that the presence of
storage has the potential to reduce both the total number and the overall cost of generator
starts. These results echo Harris et al. (2012), who also studied the impact of storage on
unit commitment and reserve provision (though not for a range of storage penetration levels
and with a focus on CAES), and found that low penetrations of storage appear to be the
most sensible in the short run.
In combination, these factors indicate that storage is most beneficial in a system that
has both large reserve requirements, as in the high renewables cases, and a large difference
in marginal costs between low- and high-cost plants, as in the high gas price cases. While it
is likely that renewables will encourage increases in reserve requirements in future systems,
it is less likely that the spread in fossil fuel generation prices will stay large. With the recent
decrease in natural gas prices due to hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling (“fracking”),
the energy supply system has moved away from a price dichotomy that is advantageous for
storage, and is closer to a system in which storage has a smaller effect on the economics of
operations7. In the scenarios with higher renewables penetrations and lower gas prices, the
operating cost benefits achieved with storage are unlikely to justify capital cost expenditures
on storage, even at aggressive capital cost estimates and low penetrations of storage. In
these cases, it is very likely that the capacity value for storage will dominate any of the
operational benefits we model here.
With respect to carbon emissions, the presence of storage on the system causes an increase
in CO2 emissions for all scenarios, except at very small storage penetrations in the high
renewables / high gas case. This is due to increased usage of coal plants in lower demand,
low price hours to charge storage devices. As long as the marginal price of electricity from
gas exceeds that for coal (as it does in all scenarios we investigated), the cheapest times to
charge storage devices will tend to be in hours when there are more coal plants on. This
implied that the energy stored in and then delivered by the storage devices will be dirtier
than the energy supplied without storage. Relative to system-wide emissions, the increases
are small; around a 1.4% increase in emissions from the 2005 level. It is worth noting other
recent work has come to similar conclusions but with different modeling assumptions; in
Hittinger and Azevedo (2015), the authors only examined bulk energy shifting, or arbitrage,
but also found that storage increased carbon emissions.
7Of course, though it may seem unlikely, future prices could change just as suddenly as they did with the
introduction of fracking, and we cannot rule out a future fuel price scenario that favors more energy storage.
22
Overall, the benefits from increasing the presence of storage decline rapidly as installed
capacity increases. At 10 GWh of installed capacity, operating cost benefits for all but
the high renewables / high gas price scenario are negligible. In the high renewables / high
gas case, benefits at 10 GWh are less than $100/kWh; this is well below current prices but
potentially achievable in the future if storage cost targets are met. However in most scenarios
carbon intensity continues to increase beyond 10 GWh of installed capacity. This suggests
that for the infrastructure we modeled – a simplified version of WECC – targets to install
more than 10 GWh of energy storage are unlikely to be cost effective from an operating cost
perspective in any near term future scenarios.
As we noted above the capacity value of storage (approximately $160/kWh assuming
with 4 hour discharge capability storage could replace a $650/kW combustion turbine) could
become a very important part of its value as operating cost benefits decline. If storage cost
targets are met, capacity value alone could support significant expansion of storage capacity.
In this case we expect that the operating cost benefits we observe would still be realized,
except on the limited peak net demand days when storage capacity is required for system
reliability.
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Though the operational value of storage is high at very low penetrations, our analysis
indicates that at modest penetrations (10 GWh, or 6 minutes of average energy demand
in the model) the operational value is unlikely to compensate for storage capital costs in
the foreseeable future. To the extent storage is used to reduce operating costs, our analysis
indicates that price arbitrage will be an insignificant factor, and that reserve provision will
dominate. This suggests that operating cost savings on their own do not likely constitute a
motivation for policies that incentivize storage installations, even if it is on the expectation
that those policies will indirectly drive installed costs downward. However we note that
reserve markets that capture the actual value of storage are in early stages; policy makers
might consider initiatives to expand how much access storage owners have to reserve markets.
Our analysis also indicates that operating cost savings quickly fall below plausible stor-
age capacity values, and therefore capacity value is likely to be a significant component of
the total transmission-level benefits of storage. Indeed, if storage if cost targets are met,
according to our calculations, generation capacity value alone justify the cost of storage.
However we made a simple assumption that 4 hours of energy storage capability would be
sufficient to reproduce peaker plant capacity. The total quantity of energy storage required
for capacity value in practice could be more or less, depending on peak net load shapes but
also the way storage is discharged in peak conditions. Because it is energy-limited, operators
will likely discharge storage conservatively to ensure system reliability. If capacity value is
to dominate operating cost benefits as a source of storage value, it will be important for
storage owners, system operators, utilities and regulators to agree on best-practice discharge
control algorithms in peak conditions.
We note, however, that our analysis did not investigate locational capacity value, both
at the transmission level where “load pockets” can lead to very high local capacity costs and
for distribution systems where substation and conductor capacity may require upgrades to
manage peak load growth. These very important circumstances are beyond the scope of the
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present analysis; addressing them in detail would require detailed transmission models and
circuit-level distribution capacity data.
We found that storage operations can increase system-wide carbon emissions: by reduc-
ing the required number of generator starts and providing flexible reserves, storage makes
additional room for coal in the dispatch order. It is important for regulators and system
operators to consider policies and operating strategies that could be used to avoid this out-
come. However we expect that those policies would limit the operating cost benefits to
storage and, as a consequence, diminish the financial incentive for storage owners to expand
installed capacity.
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